Impartiality and Bias at the ICJ 185 lematic, as it advocates a subjectivist analysis of judicial behaviour that is incomplete. By restricting partiality to the circular claim that``since [judicial decisions are] made by men who, in their attitudes, proclivities, and intellectual tendencies, are to a significant degree products of the environments that relate them to local and national systems of social values, there can be no men impartial in disputes between States'' , 6 more important constraints are overlooked. Although factors such as national loyalty, the selection process, the manner in which judges align themselves into voting blocs on the bench and questions of procedural fairness 7 could surely prove important considerations if empirically cognisable, there is no evidence that the Court's judges systematically`vote their preferences' or are instructed by their governments. 8 Divining the reasons for judicial behaviour is a Sisyphean task riddled with methodological concerns. First, it is virtually impossible to ascertain the truth merely from interviews and constructed biographies without at least a degree of speculation, as judges are bound by the veil of secrecy that protects their deliberations; this might explain why a accurate scholarly treatment of judicial behaviour is probably unattainable. 9 Moreover, theories of judicial behaviour based wholly on national bias remain incomplete, dismissing as they do other important influences which are objectively discernible: training in a particular legal tradition; professional training in diplomacy, government, or practice; institutional loyalty; and even an individual's judge's conception of the judicial everyone is biased, and perhaps then no one can judge.'' 6 T. Franck,`Some Psychological Factors in International Third Party Decision-Making' , (1967) 19 
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Gleider I. Hernández function within the international legal order.
10
In this respect, criticism of judges often rests on the appraiser's valuesystem and his or her subjective understanding of the judicial function without appreciating the complex manner in which a judge's particular judicial methodology and discipline also operate in shaping judicial decisions. 11 This article aims therefore to move beyond such subjective analyses, and will eschew matters of corruptibility and of national or political bias. It will also ignore the nationality of the judges, the political interests of states, and questions relating to the representation of different regions or legal traditions on the bench, leaving these considerations to other authors. 12 As an analysis of constraints incumbent on international judges depends on far more than their personal history or psychological profile, and is in fact the fruit of the unique constraints inherent in the judicial role, 13 this piece will focus on distilling those``ordinarily unchallengeable factors ' 15 of judicial decision. Those factors include the direct restrictions due to its institutional structure, concern for its prestige and authority, which may also include concerns of individual members for their legacy and reputation, 16 whether what Lauterpacht calls a``judicial idealism intent upon extending the domain of law'' 17 exists, and concerns about the appearance and form of impartiality. These influences are inherent in the adjudicative discipline, 18 and the reason for focussing on these particular constraints is that, unlike subjectivist concerns that cannot be empirically identified, there is sufficient evidence in the Court's institutional structure and procedure, as well as occasionally in its own judgments, where such constraints manifest themselves. As such, the preoccupation over impartiality within the Court remains live; and elucidating how the Court understands impartiality remains an important consideration in discerning how the Court understands its own judicial function.
inter alia, social and educational background, service or employment background or history, political associations, and membership in certain bodies as such``unchallengeable'' factors. 15 E.W. Thomas and 44-7 who argues that judges are``trustees'' rather than agents, distinguished from the latter by the relative independence and individual qualifications, but nevertheless acting``on behalf of'' States appointing them. Cf. Posner and Yoo, supra note 5, at 27 who transcend arguments of partiality or bias simpliciter to claim that not only do international judges act as conscious agents of their national State's interests, but that their actual function of ICJ judges is to circumscribe and control the authority of the Court's judgments. Methodological difficulties permeate these claims of State dependence:``it is the essence of being a judge to be impartial and independent, and he or she publicly will not relinquish that role. To argue otherwise without concrete evidence is to theorise on the basis of speculation.'' Unusually, Cogan, supra note 2, at 415 argues that in fact, because States are unable to control judicial decision-making,``we need to think anew about how to maintain control over [international courts].'' 17 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 12, at 205. Lauterpacht explains that this tendencỳ`c eases to be legitimate when, in the pursuit of a progressive and ethical solution, judges are driven to disregard a clear rule grounded in the practice of States and in the imperative requirements of the stability of the law'' , at 209. 18 Ibid., at 243.
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Defining impartiality
Despite the frequency with which judges are exhorted to be impartial, little scholarship seems to have conceptualised the notion of impartiality, even at the domestic level. 19 It is true that impartiality is a difficult concept to articulate from a legal standpoint, raising as it does the basic question: impartiality in relation to what? Proximity to the question at hand has two facets: it may either contaminate one's ability to be impartial, or in fact reinforce one's ability to reason from expertise. 20 More importantly, one's theory of justice, on the conception of the`common good' , and on the nature of law all inevitably colour one's conception of impartiality. The classic jurisprudential debates between Herbert Hart and Lon Fuller also led to diverging views on the judicial function and the role impartiality could play within it. Hart's argument, in the main, was that that judicial impartiality could be realised by courts weighing and balancing the competing interests of claimants, 21 but only in the light of valid legal rules-rules accepted as valid because they pass Hart's rules of recognition-would form the reason for his/her judgment. 22 Fuller, by contrast, situated judicial impartiality differently: whilst certainly a judge was to remain neutral among the moral positions embedded in the substantive law or rule he/she meant to apply, the judicial function required fidelity to the law's internal morality in assessing the validity of such rules; 23 impartiality thus took a substantive dimension. As such, whilst their substantive directives to judges to be impartial are much the same, the content of the term`impartiality' is rather different.
The understanding of impartiality cannot be discerned through any overarching normative proposition, but is instead dependent on the context in which it is invoked. 24 For the Court, impartiality seems generally to be demanded in the sense of judicial independence; 25 this translates into acting``independently of all outside influence or interventions whatsoever, in the exercise of the judicial function entrusted to it alone by the Charter and its Statute. '' 26 Defined as such, it is essentially relational, and encompasses primarily procedural impartiality, in that both parties are treated equally, and the outcome is wholly dependent on the direct dispute. 27 If one focuses specifically on the International Court's practice, its relatively formalistic standards suggest a concern for adherence primarily, if not exclusively, using this definition.
28
A caveat: judicial decision-making at the Court cannot be fully understood purely by reference to formal attributes of the institution; although these may be crucial to understanding its judicial function, regard must be had for the functions attributed to the individual judges themselves. In this respect, a Member of the International Court exercises a function somewhat distinct from that of the Court itself. From an adjudicatory perspective, the judge is expected to uphold the function of the Court and the international legal norms that body is bound to apply. However, rooted in the consensual and arbitration-based history of international dispute settlement, there also exists discernible pressure on judges to fulfil a certain representational role. 29 
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Gleider I. Hernández the emphasis on judicial independence and high qualifications stipulated in Article 2 of the Statute, 30 Article 9 embodies the notion that``as a whole'' , the Court should ensure the representation of``the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world. '' 31 This representational element permeating the judicial role has raised, and continues to raise, concerns that the role of the Court's judges is constrained: already during the time of the PCIJ, Moore, Loder and Anzilotti cautioned that``of all the influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle '' 32 than that of national bias; that preoccupation underlies the exhortation towards impartiality embodied in the judicial oath. 33 That distinction, between judge and judicial institution, permeates the discussion that follows below.
Process, and Politics (OUP, 2010), at 25 who argues that this is perhaps no different than in domestic courts, where there is increasing demand that the judiciary``needs to be broadly reflective of the make-up of society in order for it to command public confidence and maintain political legitimacy as an unelected institution of power'' . It should be noted that considerations of``representation'' on the domestic plane turn primarily on ethnicity, gender and socio-economic status. See for example Lucy, supra note 19, at 15-6 referring to B. 3 Certain constraints on judicial behaviour
Legal education and training; views on the function of law
Legal education and training constitute a constraint upon both domestic and international judges, who are institutionally``conditioned in such a way as to virtually preclude the possibility of stepping outside the bounds of legitimate judicial reasoning'' . 34 Judges also demonstrate loyalty to their oath of impartiality, characterised as``sacred'' by Lauterpacht, who considered judicial impartiality a conscious decision to assume the moral duty of``the enlightened consideration of the paramount interest of peace and justice entrusted to the care of judges. '' 35 As mentioned earlier, besides the obligation to remain impartial, Article 9 also suggests that within the Court, there should be representation of thè`m ain forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world. '' 36 From the outset, these provisions aimed to reflect the``distinct forms of legal education'' through which one could approach a unified public international law. 37 This seems borne out in practice: there appears to exist a remarkable intellectual homogeneity amongst the judges, one which transcends their varied origins. 38 Though this in no way implies universality of thought, the extent to which Western conceptions of public international law and the judicial function 34 Thomas, supra note 15, at 245. 35 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 12, at 215. Lauterpacht argued that although international judges can act impartially, institutional steps should be taken to ensure said impartiality, primarily through the proscription of any factors of national representation, especially taking issue with the institution of the judge ad hoc, which he criticised as possessing a``fatal lack of rationality'' , at 233-6. He also freely acknowledged that``by birth, training, and community of sentiment and interest'' , judges belonged to one particular section of a population, at 216-7. 36 40 and might partly explain why all of the current judges-and the vast majority of its past judges-have read law in universities in the United States, the United Kingdom or France. 41 Doubtless there is great diversity in the perception of the judicial function within even those three traditions: the distinction between the civil law traditions and common law traditions embodied by these three jurisdictions could be argued to be broadly representative of a fair, if not universal, sampling of States. 42 Yet overall, if one moves away from pure geographical representation and considers other factors, the reputed at 407. Hambro argued that``[ Judges] are to apply international law, but even international law is taught differently and applied differently in different countries according to the legal systems prevailing … Nobody can doubt that the judges in applying such principles are influenced by their backgrounds. … This explains sufficiently why the voting at times looks as if it goes according to nationality; but this does not in any way even remotely imply that the judges receive any kind of intimation, let alone instructions, from their governments on how they should vote. ' 
Conceptions of institutional propriety and belonging'
Judges have a keen sense of their own participation in upholding the function of the court of which they are a member; and they inevitably perceive themselves as``part of an institution and an ongoing legal process that began well before them and that will continue long after they have gone. '' 44 This sense of continuity and institutional belonging is entrenched and formalised by the collective drafting process of the Court, creating a sense of collective loyalty where each judge will strive to meet the individual and collective expectations of their colleagues in respect of their expectations of the judicial role and that of a member of the institution. 45 In``complete equality'' with their peers, 46 judges ad hoc are held to the same standard, although the specific nature of that institution creates a somewhat different expectation of their role, which will not be explored here.
47
Consistent with the sense of institutional propriety and belonging is the sense by judges of their own individual function. As Theodor Meron has suggested, any person accepting international judicial office must accept``the values, the duties, and the instincts of one who holds such an office. '' 48 There is doubtless heterogeneity in these self-perceptions, with divergence in judges' concerns about the neglect of other systems at the expense of these systems; but cf. Rosenne, Law and Practice, supra note 36, at 397 decrying the heterogeneity of the Court as a possible cause of unpredictability in litigation. 43 perceptions of the role of the Court in law-making, for example, 49 and with some judges arguably even defining their role in opposition to the institution of which they form a part. 50 Yet, for all this, some broad-brush, basic notions of a judge's role can be identified.
51
A judge is held to decide a case in line with a correct or`proper' interpretation of the applicable law: in short, deciding similar cases consistently with other decisions and more general legal principles. 52 In line with this requirement, a judge is called upon to strive to decide in a principled, objective manner, 53 with the absence of prior emotional attachment to a given case, either by direct personal interest or through strong political or ideological views that would predetermine the outcome.
54
Frédéric Mégret calls this a dédoublement, the ability of the individual to reduce him/herself to the function of the judge, and to limit the subjectivity of the person. contractus rule a``transactional'' approach (para. 6), and as a form of``haptophobia'' (fear of being touched) (para. 7). 50 It is true that the occasional`great dissenter' appears within the Court, who consciously casts him or herself in the role of challenging the institution from within, and calling it to account for failing to conform with that judge's expectations of the judicial role. That role seems presently to be occupied by Judge Cançado Trindade, whose lengthy dissenting opinions regularly exceed the length of the Court's own judgments. 51 See for example B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, 1921), at 12-3. 52 Lucy, supra note 19, at 23, calls this principle of treating like cases alike a``bulwark against partiality'' , as it imposes a burden on a court to explain why a putatively similar case is not actually sufficiently legal similar to the current case, and that burden at least makes improper partiality more difficult than it might otherwise be. 53 Cass, supra note 3, at 947-8. 54 As Mégret, supra note 4, at 44 points out, obvious ethnic, racial or religious biases would figure amongst such predispositions. 55 Ibid. 56 See for example Article 36(8)(a)(iii) of the Rome Statute for the Establishment of an Interna-put forward that this would ensure that certain values are considered by the bench. In some respects, this might be true: certainly a feminist approach to law and legal reasoning might yield different judicial outcomes, inasmuch as the law sometimes contains aspects of context or situation which do not address the specific concerns of the feminist critique. 57 But that is altogether a different assertion than claiming that the mere presence of women necessarily modifies judicial reasoning. For example, it can safely be asserted that a consciously gendered approach to international law is wholly absent in the long line of case law in which the Court's first female judge, Dame Rosalyn Higgins, participated in or presided over. 58 Although generalisations based on Judge Higgins' tenure are incautious, given her singular role for many years, , at 81-2 concluding with rue, that the international legal training of women conditions them to think about law no differently from men; and that in any event, the practice of collective drafting is such that it would reduce the scope of alternative or controversial approaches in the majority opinions. 58 This is surely intentional. In the words of Judge Higgins herself:``Men sometimes speak about women having more intuition and so forth. I don't accept that. I think we're either smart lawyers or not smart lawyers; we either know a lot or we don't know a lot. Gender has nothing to do with it. In the international criminal field some of the women judges say it really does make a difference whether you're a woman judge when you're looking at issues of rape and so forth. I cannot stand in their shoes, and disagree with them. But at the same time I like to think that both sexes are equally appalled at such things. 
Wider external community expectations
The Court's judges are obliged to pay heed to the expectations of States and the wider United Nations framework. 61 In the early days of the Court, thenPresident Basdevant admitted candidly that its docket would be dependent on governments, the political organs of the UN, and the decisions that these might choose to bring before it. 62 Efforts were made from the outset to separate nominations from States, placing the process with the four members of the`national group' of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which nominates a candidate under Article 4 of the Statute. 63 Even though the national group is not recommended to consult States under Article 6 of the Statute, 64 they remain central throughout the entire process: they nominate the four members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration; they finance and control the campaigning process; and of course, it is States who cast final votes in the General Assembly and the Security Council. 65 Moreover, whatever the merits of the election procedure, there is no formal supervisory mechanism in place to review whether candidates for election meet the criteria provided for in Article 2. 67 Thus, nominated candidates will rarely hold views which are wholly irreconcilable with State concerns. 68 Furthermore, it has elsewhere been observed 69 how the Court's judges' career paths prior to election are relatively homogenous, with candidates primarily drawn from the diplomatic corps 70 or civil service of States, from academia, and, to a diminishing degree relative to the early days of the Permanent Court, from national judiciaries. 71 In fact, many nominated candi- or, in the case of academics, have often spent long periods being of counsel to governments on questions of international law. 73 At the very least, candidates rely on the support of their national State, which must invest considerable political capital in the campaign process.
74 Accordingly, by the time they are nominated, their career path will already have``sensitized them to be especially mindful of the prerogatives of national sovereignty. '' 75 This being the case, the selection process therefore guarantees a certain community of sentiment on the bench, 76 qualitatively different from the putative universalism imposed al, supra note 29, at 57-9 suggest that despite contested definitions of judicial independence, States nevertheless feel comfortable putting forward diplomats for high judicial office due to their representational capacity and their negotiating experience. 72 Rosenne, supra note 66, at 391 posits that the high proportion of judges who occupied the position of Legal Adviser to their foreign ministries puts them in delicate positions, given that such the exercise of duties relating to that office invariably requires them to acquaint themselves and form an opinion on most currently known international disputes prior to their election to judicial office. represented their government as ambassador or other high representative; acted as counsel for their national State in international adjudication, whether before the International Court or another body; acted as legal officer to their foreign or justice ministry; or led a delegation of their national State at a diplomatic conference. 76 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 12, at 217 refers to these as``class interests'' , although he also states that they are rare, by virtue of the``categorical imperative of duty'' and thè`p owerful voice of justice''; and in Lauterpacht,`Amendments' , supra note 12, at 102, and Lauterpacht,`Revision' , supra note 12, at 124-6, he emphasises instead that judges should be experts in international law. Franck and Prows, supra note 75, at 242 claim that ICJ judges, sharing a common and self-imposed perception of the limits of their craft, seek refuge from politically or culturally freighted disagreements by way of``neutered disagreements'' about facts, thus leaving an important part of its work-``promoting growth of the law through by Article 9. 77 This view is distinct from the argument that individual judges are beholden to their State in an individual capacity, 78 and it does not require one to impugn the impartiality of members of the Court vis-à-vis their national State (or any other). Even so, it suffices to observe that the judges, as a group, are intellectually disposed to a legal reasoning broadly resembling that of the State with whom they have the closest connection, and that such judges will arrive at similar conclusions to the said States``par affinité, parenté ou identité intellectuelle.'' 79 Accordingly, one can identify objectively an intellectual affinity of international judges with the policies of States, a wholly different argument than that of institutional control by States over the work of international courts. 80 Whilst compliance with ICJ judgments is generally considered high, 81 the continued activity of the Court depends on more than merely satisfying the parties before it (or the requesting international organ); it also must contend with potential and future disputes between States. Thus, the Court must not only demonstrate a modicum of independence and impartiality when deciding cases, but it must also demonstrate a view of substantive international law that conceptualization and intellectual struggle''-undone. 77 Malleson et al, supra note 14, at 31 in conducting interviews with senior diplomatic staff, serving and retired judges, have called attention to a certain disquiet that the concept of``equitable geographical distribution'' embodied in Article 9 is in fact unfair,`p etrifying'' power balances of the Charter era and strongly favouring Europe (including the geopolitically obsolete``Eastern European Group'') to the detriment of Asia and other regions. That concept also applies, of course, in relation to the Security Council: see Article 23 of the UN Charter. 78 Ibid., at 26-7 recounting how an ICJ judge explained feeling like an``ambassador'' of his State at times. 79 G. de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure (Masson, 1989) , at 157; and as he points out, this is in fact in perfect harmony with the representational condition found in 
Allegations of partiality, or of national/political bias
As noted above, the most controversial and damaging accusation levelled against judges of the Court is that they are guilty of partiality, or of national or political bias; and numerous academic studies have been devoted to either proving or disproving this very point. A judge-as needs no emphasis-is bound to be impartial, objective, detached, disinterested and unbiased. In invoking the assistance of this Court or accepting its jurisdiction, States must feel assured that the facts of the dispute will be properly elicited; they must have the certainty that their jural relationship will be properly defined and that no partiality will result in injustice towards them. Thus those on the bench may represent different schools of law, may have different ideas about law and justice, be inspired by conflicting philosophies or travel on divergent roads-as indeed will often be true of the States parties to a case-and that their characters, outlook and background will widely differ is virtually a corollary of the diversity imposed by the Statute. But whatever philosophy the judges may confess they are bound to``master the acts'' and then apply to them the law with utmost honesty.
[…]
This variety of origin is certainly the great strength of this Court. It is a major contributory factor to the confidence that all states may feel in the balanced nature of the Court's decisions and the broad spectrum of legal opinion they represent. But can this diversity 92 100 Given a situation where even one of his own colleagues doubted his capacity to act impartially, one cannot but infer that Judge Elaraby's separate opinion was motivated by the controversy surrounding him.
101
Extra-judicially, Judge Schwebel has proffered the following explanation about the (lack of) impartiality demonstrated by international judges which, in the light of criticism of some of his votes in Nicaragua, takes a discernibly defensive tone:`W e [judges] are all prisoners of our own experience. Such measure of objectivity as may be humanly possible may come more easily to some than others, depending in part on that experience, in which the legal and political culture that conditioned it is important. Clearly judges manifest and in the history of civilisation have manifested a measure of objectivity. If not, the judiciary would not exist. '' 102 These rare individual excursions are illustrative of why explicit discussion of this topic by the Court is so exceptional. Even so, the statements reviewed 99 Ibid., para. 9. 100 Ibid., ( Judge Buergenthal, Dissenting Opinion), p. 9, para. 11:``[a] court of law must be free and, in my opinion, is required to consider whether one of its judges has expressed views or taken positions that create the impression that he will not be able to consider the issues raised in a case or advisory opinion in a fair and impartial manner, that is, that he may be deemed to have prejudged one or more of the issues bearing on the subject-matter of the dispute before the court. That is what is meant by the dictum that the fair and proper administration of justice requires that justice not only be done, but that it also be seen to be done'' . 101 
Final Reflections on Impartiality
The notion of judicial impartiality being wedded to concerns over nationality and bias ignores the indirect stake that many states and international actors have in the judicial pronouncements of the Court. With its increased docket, genuine concerns over the structural and institutional constraints described above are ever more salient, and the Court's understanding of its judicial function should be approached from all possible angles. The Court might indeed-to paraphrase Allott-speak to states the words states want to hear. 108 Yet even if this is so, that phenomenon ought best to be understood in the context in which the Court operates, instead of simply indicting the Court as a biased, subordinate institution. It is true that cannot always come to a case dispassionately and with only knowledge of the case that is put before a court. Experienced judges often come to a case with substantial knowledge of the context or facts surrounding it, and may be chosen precisely because of this relative legal and political`worldliness' . 109 Yet the fact that judges have convictions and make value judgements, in good faith, in the exercise of their function is not necessarily problematic: 110 the very ability to abstract
